SIPRI 2026 Explained: India's 190 Nuclear Warheads, the Triad & No First Use Doctrine

The institute: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent international research institute based in Sweden, founded in 1966, that studies armaments, disarmament, arms transfers, military expenditure and international security. It is widely regarded as an authoritative, non-governmental source on global military trends.

The Yearbook: The SIPRI Yearbook is an annual assessment of the state of armaments, disarmament and international security. Its chapter on world nuclear forces provides closely watched estimates of each nuclear-armed state's arsenal. Importantly, because countries like India do not release official figures, SIPRI's numbers are informed estimates based on open-source analysis, missile-test data and satellite imagery — not confirmed government data.

India's stockpile: SIPRI estimates India's total nuclear stockpile at approximately 190 warheads as of January 2026, an increase of about 10 from the previous year, with roughly 12 of these currently deployed. India is assessed to have slightly expanded its arsenal and continued developing new types of delivery systems during 2025.

Pakistan's stockpile: Pakistan's arsenal is assessed to have remained stable at around 170 warheads, though it continued to develop new delivery systems and accumulate fissile material — suggesting its arsenal could expand over the coming decade.

The China dimension: SIPRI notes that while Pakistan remains a central focus of India's nuclear planning, India's modernisation is increasingly oriented toward longer-range systems capable of reaching targets throughout China. This reflects the changing strategic environment in which India must factor in both its western and northern neighbours.

The global picture: At the start of 2026, the nine nuclear-armed states — the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — together possessed about 12,187 nuclear warheads. Of these, roughly 9,700 were in military stockpiles considered potentially usable, with the overwhelming majority held by Russia and the United States. SIPRI cautioned that states are increasingly relying on nuclear weapons, reversing decades of efforts to reduce their numbers and role.

The assessment: SIPRI observed that it has long been assumed India stores its nuclear warheads separately from its delivery systems (launchers) during peacetime — a posture reflecting restraint. However, India's recent moves toward canisterisation (sealing missiles with warheads in ready-to-launch containers) and toward conducting sea-based deterrence patrols suggest India could be shifting in the direction of mating some warheads with their launchers even in peacetime.

The submarine patrol point: On this basis, SIPRI estimates that, as of January 2026, India may have begun deploying a small number of nuclear warheads on a single SSBN (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine) conducting occasional deterrence patrols. This is significant because a submarine on patrol with armed missiles represents a continuously available, survivable deterrent — a qualitative step beyond storing warheads in peacetime.

The foundation: India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 (Pokhran-I) and declared itself a nuclear-weapon state after the Pokhran-II tests of May 1998. It released a Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999, and the Cabinet Committee on Security formally adopted India's nuclear doctrine on 4 January 2003.

Credible Minimum Deterrence: India does not seek nuclear parity or the largest arsenal; it aims only for an arsenal large and survivable enough to deter an adversary by guaranteeing unacceptable retaliation. The emphasis is on "credible" and "minimum" — enough to deter, but no more.

No First Use (NFU): India commits not to use nuclear weapons first. It would use them only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces. (The 2003 doctrine added that India retains the option of nuclear retaliation in the event of a major attack with biological or chemical weapons.)

Massive retaliation: India's doctrine states that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. The credibility of this threat depends on having a survivable arsenal that can strike back even after absorbing a first strike.

Other commitments: The doctrine also includes non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, a continued moratorium on nuclear testing, strict export controls, and a commitment to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament.

The concept: A nuclear triad is the ability to deliver nuclear weapons from three platforms — land, air and sea. Possessing all three makes a country's deterrent far more survivable, because an adversary cannot eliminate the entire arsenal in a single surprise (first) strike. Only a handful of states possess a full triad.

The land leg: India's land-based leg consists of the Agni series of ballistic missiles, ranging from the short-range Agni-I to the Agni-V (with a range of over 5,000 km, capable of reaching across China), along with the Prithvi series. Many newer missiles are road-mobile and canisterised for survivability and quick launch, and the Agni-V has been tested with MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) technology.

The air leg: The air-based leg uses nuclear-capable aircraft such as the Mirage-2000, Su-30MKI and Rafale, which offer flexibility but are comparatively more vulnerable.

The sea leg: The sea-based leg — the most survivable — is built around Arihant-class SSBNs (INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, followed by additional boats of the class) carrying K-series submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the shorter-range K-15 and the longer-range K-4. A submarine hidden underwater for long periods is extremely hard to detect and destroy, making it the ideal platform for assured retaliation.

The core of deterrence: Second-strike capability is the ability to respond with a nuclear strike even after suffering a nuclear first strike. For a No First Use country like India, this is the foundation of its entire deterrence posture — the adversary must believe that any first strike would invite a devastating, unavoidable response.

Why the sea leg is crucial: Land-based missiles and aircraft can be located and targeted in a first strike. A nuclear submarine on patrol, by contrast, can remain submerged and undetected for months, guaranteeing that retaliation remains possible. This is precisely why the SIPRI observation about India deploying warheads on an SSBN on patrol is strategically meaningful — it strengthens the survivability that underpins credible minimum deterrence.

Civilian control: India's nuclear weapons are under strict civilian political control. The decision to use them rests with the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), established in 2003.

The structure: The NCA comprises a Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, which alone can authorise the use of nuclear weapons, and an Executive Council, chaired by the National Security Adviser, which provides inputs and executes directives. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), a tri-services command also established in 2003, manages and operates India's nuclear forces, including its land, air and sea-based delivery systems. Even though naval crews operate the submarines, operational nuclear command remains with the SFC under the NCA.

Pakistan: Unlike India, Pakistan has not adopted a No First Use policy. Its posture allows for the first use of nuclear weapons, including the possible use of short-range "tactical" nuclear weapons to offset India's larger conventional forces. This asymmetry is a central feature of South Asia's nuclear dynamics. SIPRI notes Pakistan is developing a nascent triad of its own.

China: China, which formally maintains a No First Use policy, is in the midst of a substantial expansion of its arsenal — estimated by SIPRI at around 620 warheads — adding a major dimension to India's long-term strategic planning.

Outside the NPT: India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it regards as discriminatory because it divides the world into recognised nuclear-weapon states (those that tested before 1967) and the rest. India has also not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), while maintaining a voluntary moratorium on testing.

Export-control regimes: Despite being outside the NPT, India has been admitted to several multilateral export-control regimes in recognition of its non-proliferation record — the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR, 2016), the Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and the Australia Group (2018). Its bid for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) remains pending, chiefly due to opposition from some members.

The SIPRI Yearbook 2026 underscores a worrying global trend — the renewed reliance on nuclear weapons and the weakening of arms-control regimes at a time of rising geopolitical tension. For India, the findings reaffirm a steady, calibrated modernisation aligned with its doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and No First Use, with growing emphasis on a survivable sea-based deterrent. The key challenge will be to maintain a credible second-strike capability — essential for the integrity of the No First Use posture — while continuing to exercise the restraint that has defined India's image as a responsible nuclear power. In a region with an unstable nuclear neighbour and an expanding one, India's long-term security interest lies in strengthening deterrence stability, investing in secure command-and-control, avoiding an open arms race, and continuing to advocate for global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament.