35th WMCC Meeting in Beijing Explained: India-China Push Border Delimitation, Trans-Border Rivers and Normalisation of Ties

Establishment and Purpose: The WMCC is a diplomatic-level institutional mechanism between India and China established in January 2012 during the visit of the then National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon to Beijing. Its main objective is to deal with the day-to-day management of the border situation, exchange views on issues of mutual concern, and ensure peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It was set up because the Special Representatives (SR) talks were conducted only periodically and at a very high political level, while ground-level border incidents required a more frequent and technical-diplomatic forum.

Composition: The Indian side is led by the Joint Secretary (East Asia) of the Ministry of External Affairs, while the Chinese side is led by the Director General of the Boundary and Oceanic Affairs Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The mechanism brings together officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of both countries.

Mandate: The WMCC is not a forum for resolving the boundary question itself — that is the mandate of the Special Representatives. Instead, the WMCC focuses on (a) reviewing situations along the LAC, (b) discussing proposals for disengagement, (c) coordinating positions before military commander-level talks, and (d) discussing cross-border cooperation including trans-border rivers and the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra.

Track Record: Since 2012, the WMCC has held 35 meetings. Notable recent rounds include the 31st (August 2024, Beijing), 32nd (December 2024, New Delhi), 33rd (March 2025, Beijing), 34th (July 2025, New Delhi) and the 35th (May 2026, Beijing). After the Galwan clashes of June 2020, the WMCC played a key role in coordinating disengagement proposals across multiple friction points.

Origin: The Special Representatives mechanism was set up in 2003 during the visit of then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China. The objective is to explore the framework of a boundary settlement from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship. India's first SR was Brajesh Mishra, the then National Security Adviser; China's first SR was Dai Bingguo. Currently, NSA Ajit Doval is India's Special Representative and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is China's Special Representative.

Three-Step Approach: In 2005, the SR talks produced the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question." This document envisaged a three-step approach: (1) agree on guiding principles; (2) work out a framework for the settlement; and (3) demarcation on the ground.

24th Round of SR Talks (August 2025): Held in New Delhi on 19 August 2025 between Doval and Wang Yi. Both sides described the talks as "comprehensive, in-depth and fruitful." They agreed on ten points of consensus and acknowledged the Modi-Xi Kazan meeting (October 2024) as a "turning point" for India-China relations. The SR talks resumed after a five-year gap following the Galwan clashes; the 23rd round had been held in Beijing in December 2024.

WMCC vs SR — The Distinction: The SR mechanism is a high-level political dialogue on the substantive boundary question; the WMCC is an operational diplomatic mechanism for day-to-day border management. The WMCC reports up to the SR; the SR sets the political direction.

Definition: The LAC is the de facto boundary between India and China resulting from the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The term was first used by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in a 1959 letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and was institutionally accepted after the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement. The LAC is approximately 3,488 km long and is not delineated on a mutually agreed map nor demarcated on the ground.

Three Sectors of the LAC:

Western Sector (Ladakh and Aksai Chin): Most contentious. India claims the entire Aksai Chin (about 38,000 sq km) controlled by China, while China claims portions of Indian Ladakh. The 2020 standoff and the Galwan clash occurred in this sector.

Middle Sector (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh): The least contentious portion of the LAC. China claims approximately 2,000 sq km here.

Eastern Sector (Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh): Follows roughly the McMahon Line. China claims about 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls "Zangnan" or "South Tibet."

McMahon Line: The boundary between Tibet and British India agreed at the Simla Convention of 1914 between Britain, Tibet and China (later repudiated by China). It is named after Sir Henry McMahon, the British Foreign Secretary in India. China rejects its validity by arguing that Tibet did not have sovereign authority to sign the treaty.

Line of Control (LoC) vs LAC: The LoC, formalised by the Shimla Agreement of 1972, divides India and Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir and is delineated on maps signed by the Directors General of Military Operations of both armies. The LAC, in contrast, has no agreed map or demarcation; it exists only on the ground as perceived by each side.

Delimitation vs Demarcation: Delimitation means defining the alignment of the boundary on a map through mutual agreement. Demarcation means physically marking it on the ground. The current WMCC talks focus on delimitation — clarifying perceptions of the LAC so that future flashpoints like Galwan can be avoided.

Civilisational and Pre-1949 Period: India and China shared deep civilisational, religious and trade contacts via the Silk Route and Buddhist exchanges. Tibet historically functioned as a buffer state. After Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1950–51, India and China shared a direct boundary for the first time.

The Panchsheel Era (1954): The "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" or Panchsheel were enshrined in the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region. The slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" defined the early years. However, China simultaneously built the Aksai Chin highway connecting Tibet and Xinjiang, discovered by India only in 1957.

1962 War: The Sino-Indian War broke out on 20 October 1962 along both the eastern and western sectors. India suffered a decisive defeat. China unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 21 November 1962 and withdrew from the eastern sector but retained Aksai Chin. India lost 1,383 soldiers; China admitted to 722 dead.

1967 Skirmishes: Clashes occurred at Nathu La and Cho La in Sikkim, where Indian forces successfully repulsed Chinese aggression.

Diplomatic Thaw: Ambassadorial-level ties, suspended since 1962, were restored in 1976. Rajiv Gandhi's landmark visit to China in 1988 reopened high-level engagement and led to the creation of the Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary question.

1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA): Signed during PM Narasimha Rao's visit to Beijing. This was the first formal agreement to maintain status quo on the LAC and resolve the boundary question through peaceful, friendly consultations. It first formally referred to the "Line of Actual Control" in a bilateral document.

1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in the Military Field: Signed during Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to India. It restricted the level of military exercises, prohibited use of firearms within 2 km of the LAC, and limited military deployment in the border areas. The "no firearms" clause is the reason troops in the Galwan clash used clubs, stones and improvised weapons.

2003 Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation: Signed during PM Vajpayee's visit. It led to the creation of the Special Representatives mechanism.

2005 Protocol on Modalities for Implementation of CBMs: Detailed operational rules for border meetings, communication and patrolling. The same year, the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles" for boundary settlement were agreed.

2012 Establishment of WMCC: Formalised regular working-level diplomatic dialogue on border affairs.

2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA): Signed during PM Manmohan Singh's visit. It introduced new CBMs after the Depsang stand-off and committed both sides to exercise maximum restraint and not follow or tail patrols in areas of differing perception.

Trigger: In April–May 2020, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) made multiple incursions across the LAC in eastern Ladakh — at Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, Gogra-Hot Springs, Depsang Plains and Demchok. The trigger was India's construction of strategic border infrastructure such as the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road.

Galwan Clash (15 June 2020): A violent hand-to-hand encounter in the Galwan Valley resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers, including Colonel Santosh Babu (Commanding Officer, 16 Bihar Regiment). It was the first combat fatality on the LAC since the 1975 Tulung La incident. China officially admitted to four soldiers killed (in February 2021), though independent estimates suggest higher numbers.

Strategic Response: India responded with mirror deployment of about 50,000–60,000 additional troops, mass mobilisation of armoured and air assets, banning of more than 200 Chinese mobile apps (TikTok, WeChat etc.), and imposing FDI restrictions under Press Note 3 (April 2020), which required prior government approval for investments from countries sharing a land border with India.

Phase 1 — Initial Disengagement (2021–2022): Through over 21 rounds of Senior Commander (Corps Commander) talks at the Chushul-Moldo border meeting point, disengagement was achieved at four friction points: North and South Banks of Pangong Tso (February 2021), Gogra (August 2021), and Patrolling Point (PP)-15 in Kugrang/Gogra-Hot Springs (September 2022). Buffer zones with patrolling moratoriums were created.

Phase 2 — Depsang and Demchok Breakthrough (October 2024): Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri announced on 21 October 2024 that India and China had reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements at Depsang Plains and Charding-Ninglung Nala Track (CNN Track) junction near Demchok. This was the last two friction points where the stand-off had remained unresolved since 2020. Patrolling and grazing rights at PP-10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13 in Depsang and at CNN Track in Demchok were restored to pre-April 2020 levels.

Phase 3 — Modi–Xi Kazan Summit (23 October 2024): PM Modi met President Xi Jinping at the sidelines of the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia — their first formal bilateral meeting since 2019. This was the political endorsement of the disengagement agreement.

Completion of Disengagement: By the end of November 2024, both sides had dismantled temporary structures, completed joint verification (on-ground and aerial), and started coordinated patrolling. However, "de-escalation" (thinning of troop deployments in depth areas) and "de-induction" (sending troops back to their original peacetime locations) are yet to begin. Approximately 50,000 troops remain in depth areas on each side.

Foreign Secretary–Vice Foreign Minister Mechanism (January 2025): During Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri's visit to Beijing, both sides agreed on a roadmap of "people-centric" steps to rebuild ties.

Kailash Mansarovar Yatra Resumption (June 2025): After a five-year suspension (since 2020 due to COVID-19 and Galwan), the yatra resumed in summer 2025 through two official routes — Lipulekh Pass (Uttarakhand, since 1981) and Nathu La Pass (Sikkim, since 2015). In 2026, the yatra is operating with 750 pilgrims selected by computerised draw (five batches of 50 via Lipulekh, ten batches of 50 via Nathu La).

Visa Liberalisation: India reopened tourist visas for Chinese nationals in July 2025 (suspended since 2020). China has eased visa rules for Indian businesspersons, journalists and tourists.

Resumption of Direct Flights: Air India Delhi–Shanghai flights launched on 1 February 2026; Air China Beijing–Delhi restarted on 21 April 2026; IndiGo Kolkata–Guangzhou and other routes are also operational.

FDI Easing (March 2026): The Union Cabinet approved changes to India's foreign direct investment policy under Press Note 3 (2020), allowing investments from "Land Bordering Countries" in manufacturing of electronic components, capital goods and solar cells.

Special Representatives 23rd and 24th Rounds: Held in December 2024 (Beijing) and August 2025 (New Delhi) respectively.

Two River Systems Originating in China: (1) The Brahmaputra system, which begins as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet and enters India as the Siang in Arunachal Pradesh, joined by tributaries Subansiri, Lohit and others; (2) The Indus system, including the Indus and Sutlej rivers.

Expert Level Mechanism (ELM): Established in 2006, the ELM is a bilateral framework for the sharing of hydrological data during the flood season (May–October) and discussion of emergency management and other trans-border river issues. It is not a legally binding treaty, but a Memorandum of Understanding-based mechanism — which allows either side to suspend it at will.

Suspension Since 2022: China stopped sharing hydrological data on the Brahmaputra in 2022 in the wake of the Galwan tensions. This has been a major Indian concern as the Brahmaputra is one of the most flood-prone rivers in the world. Resuming the ELM was therefore a key Indian demand at the 35th WMCC.

The Yarlung Tsangpo Mega-Dam (Medog County, Tibet): China has approved the construction of a 60,000 MW "super dam" at the "Great Bend" of the Yarlung Tsangpo near the Indian border in Tibet's Medog County. Total investment may exceed USD 137 billion. India and Bangladesh are concerned about (a) Chinese control over downstream water flow, (b) the risk of flooding due to sudden releases during periods of hostility, and (c) seismic risks since the project lies on a tectonic plate boundary. India is also building the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project in Arunachal Pradesh as a counter-measure.

Buffer Zones in Pangong Tso, Galwan and Gogra-Hot Springs: Patrolling moratoriums continue in these areas; pre-2020 patrolling rights have not been fully restored.

Stapled Visas to Arunachal Pradesh and J&K Residents: China issues "stapled visas" (separate paper visas not affixed inside the passport) to residents of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir, effectively challenging Indian sovereignty over these regions. India rejects these as invalid travel documents.

Renaming of Places in Arunachal Pradesh: China has periodically released lists of "standardised" Chinese names for places in Arunachal Pradesh (5 names in 2017, 15 names in 2021, 11 names in 2023, more in 2024) as part of its sovereignty claim.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): A flagship of China's Belt and Road Initiative passing through Gilgit-Baltistan, which India considers an integral part of its territory. India has consistently opposed CPEC as a violation of its sovereignty.

Trade Deficit: India's bilateral trade deficit with China has widened to a record level (over USD 100 billion in 2024-25), reflecting structural dependence on Chinese inputs in electronics, APIs, solar cells and machinery.

Strategic Issues: China's growing strategic ties with Pakistan (highlighted during the May 2025 India-Pakistan military stand-off), its presence in the Indian Ocean Region (string of pearls), and its support to Pakistan-based terror groups at the UN.

First Substantive Move on Delimitation: Since the 1993 BPTA, both sides have agreed in principle to clarify the LAC, but the process has stalled because of differing perceptions. The fact that the 35th WMCC has formally discussed "delimitation" indicates that India and China may now be moving beyond mere management of the LAC towards exploring its alignment — which was the original step envisaged in the 2005 Political Parameters.

Foundational Principle: Both India's MEA and China's Foreign Ministry have stated that "peace and tranquillity in border areas is the essential basis for normalisation of relations" — an Indian position consistently held since the Galwan clashes, in contrast to China's earlier preference to "turn over a new leaf."

Strategic Context: With the global order in flux — US tariff pressure on both countries, India's BRICS chairmanship in 2026, the upcoming SCO Summit chaired by Kyrgyzstan, and continued tensions in the Indo-Pacific — both India and China have strong incentives to stabilise their bilateral relationship.

Five Stages Ahead: Disengagement (completed) → De-escalation (yet to begin) → De-induction (yet to begin) → LAC clarification (begun at WMCC 35) → Final boundary settlement (long-term goal of SR talks).