Right to Walk a Fundamental Right: SC Reads Footpath Access into Article 21 & 19(1)(d)

The Supreme Court ruled that walking is not merely a means of transport but an essential aspect of life, liberty and dignity, and therefore the right to walk on a demarcated footpath is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. The Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar declared that this right "will take within its sweep the right to demarcated footpaths" and that such rights are "primary and shall have priority over movement by motorised vehicles." Crucially, the Court held that this right is not an empty declaration: it generates a corresponding duty on the State and civic bodies, and its violation entitles a citizen to seek compensation and restitution. The ruling arose from an ordinary motor-accident claim but was used by the Court to articulate a broad constitutional principle of pedestrian priority.

The Court anchored the right in Article 19(1)(d), which guarantees every citizen the freedom "to move freely throughout the territory of India." It read this together with the other freedoms in Article 19(1) — speech and expression (a), peaceful assembly (b), and forming associations (c) — because walking in public space is often the physical pre-condition for exercising all of them. It then linked Article 19 with Article 21, which protects "life and personal liberty." Reading Articles 19 and 21 together follows the well-established "golden triangle" approach (Articles 14, 19 and 21 reinforcing one another), under which a fundamental freedom must be enjoyed in a manner that is just, fair and consistent with the dignity of life. In short, the right to walk is treated as an unenumerated right — one not written in so many words, but derived by interpretation from these guarantees.

The judgment is the latest example of the judiciary treating the Constitution as a "living document." In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), Article 21 was read narrowly — any "procedure established by law" was enough to deprive a person of liberty. This changed decisively in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), where the Court held that such procedure must be just, fair and reasonable, linking Articles 14, 19 and 21. Through this expansive reading, Article 21 has become an "umbrella right" housing many derived rights — the right to live with human dignity (Francis Coralie Mullin, 1981), the right to livelihood and the protection of pavement users in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), the right to a clean environment (M.C. Mehta cases), the right to shelter, the right to privacy (K.S. Puttaswamy, 2017), the right to die with dignity (Common Cause, 2018), and the right against the adverse effects of climate change (M.K. Ranjit Singh, 2024). The right to walk on safe footpaths now joins this expanding family of rights.

A central contribution of this judgment is that it pairs the right with an enforceable duty. The Court said that "if the road exists, there is a duty to ensure that there are demarcated and well-maintained footpaths." It named the duty bearers as the urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and panchayats, who must demarcate, construct, maintain and protect footpaths and other pedestrian infrastructure. Importantly, the Court created a restitutionary remedy: a citizen whose right to walk on a demarcated footpath is violated can invoke constitutional and legal remedies for compensation against these authorities. This remedy, the Court clarified, is independent of the no-fault and fault-based compensation available under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, thereby shifting part of the accountability from the driver/vehicle to the civic body that failed to provide safe walking infrastructure.

Urban civic functions in India are primarily a State and local-body subject. The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 inserted Part IXA (Articles 243P–243ZG) and the Twelfth Schedule, which lists 18 functions that States may devolve to municipalities — including urban planning, regulation of land use, and roads and bridges. Pedestrian infrastructure therefore sits squarely within municipal responsibility, even though footpaths are routinely encroached, broken, or simply absent. Policy too has long recognised this: the National Urban Transport Policy, 2006 prioritised the movement of people over vehicles and emphasised non-motorised transport, and Indian Roads Congress (IRC) guidelines prescribe design standards for footpaths, including accessibility for persons with disabilities. The judgment effectively converts these scattered policy aspirations into a constitutional obligation backed by a remedy.

Recognising that an individual claim could not solve a systemic problem, the Court took three forward-looking steps. First, it suggested the creation of a dedicated regulatory body to give effect to the right to walk. Second, it re-registered the larger question as a fresh proceeding under Article 32, titled "Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath," and impleaded the Union Government so the issue can be monitored continuously. Third, it directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to the relevant ministries and the Law Commission of India to consider a law that defines pedestrian rights, the duties of authorities, and enforcement mechanisms. This converts a one-time verdict into an ongoing institutional reform process.

The ruling responds to a serious road-safety crisis in which pedestrians are among the most vulnerable road users, and to decades of vehicle-centric urban design that pushed walkers onto unsafe carriageways. By giving pedestrians constitutional priority and a compensation remedy, it strengthens the case for "people-first" cities. At the same time, the judgment raises familiar questions of implementation: cash-strapped urban local bodies, weak enforcement, and chronic encroachment may blunt its impact unless backed by funds and a statute. It also touches the recurring debate on the limits of judicial interpretation — whether reading new rights into Articles 19 and 21 risks entering the legislative and policy domain. The Court's own response — referring the matter to the Law Commission rather than itself framing detailed rules — reflects an attempt to balance rights recognition with the separation of powers.

Adopt a "pedestrian-first" urban design standard so that every new and existing road includes continuous, unobstructed and disability-friendly footpaths, in line with IRC norms and the National Urban Transport Policy.

Enact a dedicated law, as the Court suggested, clearly defining pedestrian rights, the duties of civic bodies, and enforcement and compensation mechanisms.

Strengthen and fund urban local bodies under the 74th Amendment so they can actually build and maintain pedestrian infrastructure, alongside a drive to remove encroachments.

Operationalise the proposed regulatory body and integrate pedestrian audits into road-safety governance under the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019.

Align efforts with global commitments such as SDG Target 3.6 (halving road deaths) and SDG 11 (sustainable, inclusive cities) and the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety (2021–2030).