Police Firearms at Protests Explained: Law, Limits and the Siwan AK-47 Case

The incident: During a statewide student protest, police personnel and protesters clashed at different locations in Siwan. A constable was recorded firing an AK-47 rifle into the air near JP Chowk.

Police explanation: Bihar Police stated that the constable’s team had been surrounded and that the rounds were fired in an attempt to protect personnel and property. However, senior officials also stated that he had not received orders to fire.

Administrative action: The constable was suspended and departmental proceedings were initiated. Separate cases were registered regarding the bullet injuries sustained by three civilians.

Unresolved question: Police maintained that the injuries occurred at locations away from the place where the AK-47 was fired and that no person was hit by those specific rounds. The source of all the bullets, therefore, remained a matter for investigation rather than an established fact.

Constitutional basis: The Constitution does not separately use the expression “right to protest”. The right is derived principally from Article 19(1)(a), which protects speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b), which protects the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.

Conditions attached: A constitutionally protected assembly must remain peaceful and unarmed. Violence, destruction of property or the use of criminal force may remove particular acts from constitutional protection.

Reasonable restrictions: Article 19(2) permits restrictions on speech on grounds such as public order, security of the State and incitement to an offence. Article 19(3) permits restrictions on assemblies in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India and public order.

Balance of duties: The State must enable peaceful democratic expression while protecting life, property, mobility and the rights of non-protesters. Protesters, in turn, must comply with lawful and proportionate regulatory directions.

Numerical requirement: Under BNS Section 189, an assembly must ordinarily consist of five or more persons before it can be classified as an unlawful assembly.

Common object requirement: Merely gathering in a group of five or more does not automatically make an assembly unlawful. Its common object must involve one of the purposes specified in the law, such as using criminal force against the government or a public servant, resisting the execution of law, committing an offence or compelling another person through criminal force.

Subsequent transformation: An initially lawful gathering may subsequently become unlawful if its conduct and common object change.

Individual assessment: Participation in a protest and participation in violence are not necessarily the same. Accountability should be based on conduct, evidence and the legally required common object rather than on mere physical presence at a large gathering.

Section 148—civil force: An Executive Magistrate, the officer in charge of a police station or, in the officer’s absence, a police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector may order an unlawful assembly—or an assembly of five or more persons likely to disturb public peace—to disperse.

Use of force: If the assembly refuses to disperse or demonstrates a determination not to disperse, the authorised official may use civil force and may arrest or confine participants where necessary.

Section 149—armed forces: If the assembly cannot otherwise be dispersed and public security requires its dispersal, the District Magistrate or an authorised Executive Magistrate who is present may requisition the armed forces.

Minimum-injury principle: An armed-forces officer acting under Section 149 must use as little force and cause as little injury to persons and property as is consistent with dispersing the assembly.

Emergency authority: Section 150 permits a commissioned or gazetted armed-forces officer to act where public security is manifestly endangered and communication with an Executive Magistrate is impossible. The officer must follow the Magistrate’s instructions once communication becomes practicable.

General statutory power: Section 148 authorises the use of civil force for dispersal in specified circumstances. It does not contain a weapon-by-weapon list specifying whether an AK-47, INSAS rifle, pistol, baton, tear gas or water cannon may be used.

Operational regulation: The type, degree and sequence of force are governed by the Constitution, criminal law, State police manuals, standing orders, weapon-issue rules, command instructions and the facts of the situation.

No automatic permission: The existence of a general power to disperse an assembly cannot be treated as automatic permission to fire a service rifle. The officer must still establish lawful authority, necessity, proportionality, compliance with command procedures and, where claimed, the factual basis of self-defence.

Important distinction: BNSS Section 149 concerns the requisitioning of the “armed forces” for dispersal. It should not be confused with a police officer carrying an armed service weapon during ordinary law-and-order duty.

De-escalation first: Police planning should begin with communication, negotiation, route management, announcements, adequate exits and the separation of peaceful participants from violent individuals.

Clear warning: Where dispersal becomes legally necessary, the order should be clearly communicated and reasonable time should ordinarily be given for compliance, subject to the urgency of the threat.

Physical regulation: Barricades, shields, protective equipment, targeted arrest and controlled movement may be used before escalating force.

Less-lethal options: Depending on the approved State SOP, police may use water cannons, tear smoke, PAVA shells and other authorised anti-riot equipment. The Union Government has supported States in procuring such equipment, and BPR&D has published the “Précis on Crowd Control” and a Model Police Manual.

Firearms as the last resort: Live firearms should not be treated as an ordinary crowd-dispersal instrument. Their use requires an exceptionally serious threat, strict command and fire discipline, and compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality.

State-specific framework: The Bihar Police Manual contains rules governing the organisation, deployment, conduct and discipline of Bihar Police. Bihar Police’s official website hosts its different volumes and amendments.

Rule 621: The rule deals with the requisition and disposition of armed police during serious disturbances. Its central objective is to prevent an armed party from being overwhelmed while ensuring that no more force is used than is necessary.

Controlled firing: When firing becomes unavoidable, it must be ordered, directed and controlled. Indiscriminate or independent firing is inconsistent with the purpose of the rule.

Aerial firing: A government commission report reproducing the rule records that firing in the air or over the heads of a crowd is forbidden. Such shots may travel beyond the immediate scene, injure uninvolved persons and weaken accountability over the direction and purpose of firing.

Current applicability: Operational assessment must also consider later amendments, police orders and situation-specific SOPs. The older manual cannot be read in isolation from current criminal law and administrative directions.

Falling projectile: A bullet fired upward does not disappear. It eventually loses upward momentum and returns towards the ground, potentially causing injury or death.

Unpredictable trajectory: The bullet may travel far beyond the immediate protest site, particularly when fired at an angle.

Crowd panic: The sound of live firing may produce panic, sudden movement and stampede-like conditions.

Command failure: An unauthorised warning shot may encourage other personnel to believe that firing has been ordered, increasing the danger of uncontrolled escalation.

Evidence problem: Aerial firing complicates the reconstruction of the incident because every discharged cartridge must be accounted for and matched with ballistic evidence, weapon logs and command records.

Functional definition: The Arms Act does not classify weapons merely through popular labels such as “sophisticated” or “military-grade”. Section 2(1)(i) defines prohibited arms by their technical capability.

Automatic firearm: A firearm designed so that missiles continue to be discharged while pressure remains on the trigger—until the pressure is removed or the magazine becomes empty—is a prohibited arm. An AK-pattern rifle with fully automatic capability comes within this definition.

Service-weapon exemption: Section 45 excludes from the ordinary application of the Arms Act the possession, carrying and related handling of arms by a public servant in the course of duty.

Limit of exemption: This exemption addresses lawful possession and carrying. It does not convert every discharge of a service weapon into a lawful act. Operational legality must still be tested under police rules, criminal law, superior orders and constitutional standards.

Emergency exception: Situations may arise where an officer or another person faces an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and waiting for a formal order is genuinely impossible.

Strict threshold: Self-defence is not a general exemption from police discipline. The threat must be immediate, the response necessary and the harm inflicted no greater than required to stop the threat.

Evidence-based review: Investigators must examine video recordings, injuries, weapon-discharge records, the distance and conduct of the crowd, the availability of cover or less harmful options, wireless communications and the point at which the threat ended.

No collective presumption: Stone-pelting or violence by some participants cannot automatically justify lethal force against an undifferentiated crowd. Force should be directed only against the specific threat and should cease once the danger has passed.

International standard: The UN framework requires force by law-enforcement officials to be lawful, necessary and proportionate, supported by training, clear instructions and effective accountability.

Ramlila Maidan judgment: In In Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident, the Supreme Court examined the police action used to remove a gathering from Delhi’s Ramlila Maidan.

Proportionality: The Court held that the use of tear gas, lathi charge and force in the circumstances before it was disproportionate to both the exercise of constitutional freedoms and the execution of the lawful order.

Constitutional message: A lawful restriction does not validate an unlawful method of implementation. Even where the administration is entitled to regulate or disperse a gathering, the manner of enforcement must remain reasonable and proportionate.

Dignity and security: The State has the duty to maintain order and security without violating human dignity or exercising powers beyond constitutional and statutory limits.

Departmental accountability: Suspension, weapon withdrawal, disciplinary proceedings and examination of whether standing orders or superior instructions were violated.

Criminal investigation: Registration of an FIR where an offence is alleged, examination of the scene, medical evidence, ballistic testing and statements of police personnel, protesters and independent witnesses.

Command responsibility: Inquiry should not be confined to the person who pulled the trigger. Deployment decisions, weapon allocation, briefing, supervision and the conduct of senior officers must also be examined.

Digital evidence: CCTV footage, mobile videos, body-camera recordings, drone footage, wireless messages and GPS or deployment records should be immediately secured against deletion or manipulation.

Independent oversight: Depending on the gravity of the incident, oversight may involve a magistrate, court, NHRC, State Human Rights Commission or Police Complaints Authority.

Police reform: In Prakash Singh v. Union of India, the Supreme Court directed the creation of Police Complaints Authorities to examine allegations of serious police misconduct and abuse of authority.

Weapon-deployment mismatch: Personnel carrying assault rifles for intelligence, counter-terrorism, anti-insurgency or high-risk protection duties may unexpectedly become involved in ordinary crowd-control situations without appropriate equipment or instructions.

Fragmented rules: Operational standards vary across States because police and public order fall within the State List. This can produce differences in training, terminology, accountability and access to less-lethal equipment.

Training gap: Firearms training alone is insufficient. Personnel require repeated training in de-escalation, human rights, crowd psychology, first aid, evidence preservation and stress-based decision-making.

Trust deficit: Unexplained or unauthorised firing damages public confidence in the police. At the same time, failure to protect police personnel from violent attacks can undermine morale and lawful enforcement.

Democratic balance: Effective policing requires simultaneous protection of peaceful dissent, police safety, public property and the rights of ordinary citizens who are not participating in the protest.

GS2 relevance: Fundamental Rights, reasonable restrictions, rule of law, police accountability, human rights, federalism and Supreme Court judgments.

GS3 relevance: Internal security, public order, mob violence, police modernisation and the use of technology in law enforcement.

Essay relevance: Democracy and dissent, liberty versus security, institutional accountability and the relationship between State power and citizen rights.

Ethics relevance: Proportionality, restraint, obedience to lawful orders, courage under pressure, public service values and responsibility for the use of coercive authority.

National model framework: BPR&D should finalise a comprehensive model use-of-force continuum that maps each level of threat to approved police responses while allowing States to adapt it to local conditions.

Weapon-deployment matrix: State police forces should clearly distinguish ordinary protest duties from counter-terrorism, anti-insurgency, VIP protection and high-risk operations. Personnel carrying assault rifles should not be placed in routine crowd-control formations without specific operational necessity.

Recorded command system: Orders to escalate force should, wherever practicable, be transmitted and recorded through wireless communication. Every firearm discharge should be followed by cartridge accounting, weapon examination and an incident report.

De-escalation capacity: Police units require sufficient protective gear, public-address systems, negotiators, water cannons, authorised less-lethal equipment, medical teams and trained women personnel.

Evidence preservation: CCTV, body-camera, drone, mobile and wireless records should be automatically preserved whenever serious injury, death or firearm use occurs.

Independent investigation: Cases involving live firing or serious civilian injury should be examined through an institutionally independent and time-bound process, with findings made public subject to legitimate investigative and privacy concerns.

Police accountability reforms: States should operationalise effective Police Complaints Authorities in accordance with the Prakash Singh judgment and provide them with adequate staff, investigative capacity and independence.

Protection of police personnel: Reform should not ignore threats faced by officers. Better protective equipment, adequate staffing, formation training, escape routes and clear command structures can reduce the perceived need for premature escalation.

Protest-management protocols: Administrations and organisers should agree in advance on routes, timings, communication points, emergency exits and responsibilities for preventing infiltration by violent elements.

Rights-based policing: Police evaluation should reward restraint, negotiation and safe resolution—not merely arrests or rapid dispersal—while ensuring firm action against identifiable violence and destruction of property.