Why US Called India a 'Critical Anchor' for Indo-Pacific Balance of Power at Shangri-La

• Nature of the forum: The Shangri-La Dialogue is Asia's premier inter-governmental security forum, held annually in Singapore since 2002 and named after the Shangri-La Hotel where it takes place. It is organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a London-based independent think tank. It is not a treaty body or a decision-making summit; rather, it is a "Track 1" platform where serving defence ministers, military chiefs, diplomats and security experts deliver keynote speeches, take open questions and hold bilateral meetings on the margins.

• Why it matters: The Dialogue functions as an annual "X-ray" of the Indo-Pacific's strategic mood. What gets read is not formal communiqués but who attends, at what level, and what they are willing to say in an unscripted public setting. A country signalling seriousness sends its defence minister; downgrading representation is itself a message. In 2026, for instance, China sent only an academic-level delegation rather than its defence minister, which was widely read as a step back from engagement.

• Significance for India: The forum allows India to project its Indo-Pacific vision, conduct concentrated defence diplomacy through back-to-back bilateral meetings, and pitch its growing defence-manufacturing base to potential buyers — exactly what New Delhi did in 2026 with the BrahMos announcement.

• The core statement: In his keynote, the US defence chief framed India as a "critical anchor to hold the line" in South Asia and argued that a strong India acting in its own self-interest serves the wider objective of preserving a favourable balance of power across the region. Crucially, the US framed India's value in terms of India pursuing its own national interest — not as a subordinate ally.

• The concept of balance of power: Balance of power is a foundational idea in international relations. It describes a situation in which power among states is distributed so that no single state can dominate all others. States preserve this equilibrium through internal balancing (building up their own military and economic strength) and external balancing (forming alignments and partnerships with others). The logic is that a rough equilibrium discourages any one power from attempting hegemony, thereby preserving stability.

• Application to the Indo-Pacific: The US argument is that the rapid rise of Chinese military power threatens to tilt the regional equilibrium. By describing India as an "anchor", Washington is signalling that a militarily capable India in the Indian Ocean and South Asia naturally checks any single power's dominance, without India having to formally join a US-led bloc. This is significant because it accommodates India's long-standing reluctance to enter binding military alliances.

• Geographical idea: The Indo-Pacific refers to the maritime space connecting the Indian Ocean and the western and central Pacific Ocean. It treats these two oceans as a single, interconnected strategic system rather than separate theatres. The concept gained prominence over the last two decades as trade, energy flows and naval competition increasingly linked the two oceans.

• Strategic importance: A very large share of global trade and energy passes through Indo-Pacific sea lanes and chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz and the South China Sea. Control over, or disruption of, these routes has enormous economic and military consequences, which is why the region has become a focus of major-power competition.

• India's interpretation: India has consistently described the Indo-Pacific as a free, open and inclusive region and as a geographic space rather than a military strategy aimed at any single country. This careful framing reflects India's preference for keeping the concept cooperative and inclusive, leaving room to engage all partners while resisting a purely anti-China characterisation.

• The foundational journey: India-US defence ties were rebuilt after the Cold War through a series of framework agreements. The 2005 "New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship" set the direction; a fresh 10-year framework was signed in 2015; and the latest 10-year framework — the "Framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership in the 21st Century" — was signed in October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur by India's Defence Minister and the US defence chief on the margins of the ADMM-Plus meeting. The frameworks have progressively shifted ties from a buyer-seller relationship towards co-development, co-production and interoperability.

• The COMPACT umbrella: The defence framework sits within a broader initiative called the US-India COMPACT for the 21st Century, launched in February 2025. COMPACT stands for "Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce and Technology" and links defence cooperation to trade and high technology, including an ambition to expand bilateral trade.

• Foundational (enabling) agreements: Deep military cooperation rests on four "foundational agreements" India signed over two decades — GSOMIA (information security), LEMOA (2016, reciprocal logistics support), COMCASA (2018, secure communications) and BECA (2020, geospatial intelligence sharing). These agreements make interoperability — the ability of two militaries to operate together — technically possible.

• Current deliverables: Under the framework, India and the US are pursuing co-production of the Javelin anti-tank guided missile and the Stryker infantry combat vehicle in India, additional P-8I maritime patrol aircraft for ocean surveillance, and emergency procurement of items such as the Excalibur precision-guided artillery shell. Technology platforms such as iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies) and INDUS-X (a defence start-up bridge) support joint innovation. The over-arching message Washington seeks to send is that India remains its key partner in Asia regardless of US-China dynamics.

• What BrahMos is: BrahMos is the world's fastest operational supersonic cruise missile. It is produced by BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited, a joint venture created under a 1998 inter-governmental agreement between India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia's NPO Mashinostroyeniya (NPOM). India holds the majority stake (50.5%) and Russia the rest (49.5%). The name combines the rivers Brahmaputra (India) and Moskva (Russia), symbolising the partnership.

• Technical profile (key facts): BrahMos uses a ramjet engine and travels at roughly Mach 2.8 to Mach 3 — about three times the speed of sound — which makes it extremely difficult to intercept. The standard export variant has a range of about 290 km, while extended-range Indian variants reach significantly farther. It follows a "fire-and-forget" guidance principle and can be launched from land, sea, air and submarine platforms, giving it true multi-platform versatility.

• The export story: The Philippines became the first foreign buyer in 2022 under a contract worth about USD 375 million for the shore-based anti-ship variant, with deliveries beginning in 2024. At the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, India confirmed that a deal had been signed with Vietnam — its second Southeast Asian customer — reportedly worth around USD 629 million (about ₹6,000 crore), with Indonesia close to finalising a similar agreement.

• Strategic significance: The Vietnam deal matters on several levels. First, it deepens India's defence and strategic ties with a key ASEAN partner that shares maritime-security concerns in the South China Sea. Second, it advances India's "Act East" engagement and its emergence as a net security provider and credible arms exporter, moving beyond the image of a perennial importer. Third, it strengthens India's push for self-reliance in defence (Aatmanirbhar Bharat) by demonstrating global demand for Indian-made platforms.

• Next generation: India and Russia are developing BrahMos-NG (a lighter, next-generation variant for wider aircraft integration) and the hypersonic BrahMos-II, signalling that the programme remains a long-term pillar of India's strike capability.

• From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: India's maritime doctrine began with SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), articulated by the Prime Minister from Mauritius in 2015. In March 2025, again from Mauritius, India unveiled an expanded vision called MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), which broadens the focus from the Indian Ocean to a wider, global-maritime approach combining security, trade, development and capacity-building for the Global South.

• Net security provider: India positions itself as the "net security provider" and "first responder" in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It does this through anti-piracy patrols, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), maritime-domain awareness, and by supplying patrol boats and coastal radars to smaller littoral states. The Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) helps share real-time maritime data with partner countries.

• Partnerships and outreach: India builds strong bilateral ties with island and littoral states such as Mauritius, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Seychelles, combining development assistance with security cooperation. Strategic facilities — such as the upgraded airstrip on Mauritius's Agalega Island — extend India's maritime reach.

• The Quad: India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) along with the US, Japan and Australia. First floated in 2007 and revived in 2017, the Quad promotes a free and open Indo-Pacific through cooperation on areas like maritime security, supply chains, critical technology and disaster response. India treats the Quad as a flexible, cooperative grouping rather than a military alliance.

• The doctrine: Strategic autonomy is India's foreign-policy principle of retaining independent decision-making and avoiding entanglement in any single power bloc. It is the modern evolution of India's older policy of non-alignment. In practice, it has become "multi-alignment" — engaging multiple major powers simultaneously to maximise India's own interests.

• The balancing act in practice: The BrahMos episode itself illustrates this balance — the missile is an India-Russia product being exported to Southeast Asia, even as India simultaneously deepens defence co-production with the United States. India continues to buy Russian systems while expanding US, French and Israeli partnerships, and maintains dialogue mechanisms with China despite tensions along the border.

• The "G2" concern: A recurring strategic anxiety in New Delhi is the possibility of a "G2" — a world order managed primarily by the US and China that could sideline other powers, including India. By framing India as a "critical anchor", Washington signals that it does not intend to strike a bargain with Beijing at India's expense. India, for its part, uses partnerships like the defence framework to hedge against such an outcome while preserving its independence.

• Why "self-interest" framing matters: The US deliberately praised India "acting in its own self-interest". This framing is comfortable for India because it does not require New Delhi to abandon strategic autonomy or formally take sides — India can strengthen its capabilities and partnerships while remaining its own decision-maker.

• Challenges: India's balancing strategy faces real frictions. Continued reliance on Russian-origin systems can complicate deep technology transfer from the US, where export controls (such as ITAR) and high costs slow co-production. Building genuine defence-industrial capacity at scale, ensuring timely deliveries (for example, engine supplies for indigenous aircraft) and sustaining quality for export markets remain works in progress. China's far larger defence budget and naval fleet mean India must modernise rapidly without over-committing to any single partner.

• Way forward: A balanced path involves accelerating indigenous research and manufacturing under Aatmanirbhar Bharat, diversifying defence partnerships to reduce single-source dependence, institutionalising India's MAHASAGAR maritime vision with a clear policy framework, and continuing to use platforms like the Shangri-La Dialogue and the Quad for defence diplomacy. The goal is to convert India's geographic centrality in the Indian Ocean into durable strategic weight while preserving the autonomy that defines Indian foreign policy.

• Data Snapshots (compiled from public/government sources)

India's Defence Exports (₹ crore)

• 2013-14: 686

• 2022-23: 15,920

• 2023-24: 21,083

• 2024-25: 23,622

• 2025-26: 38,424 (record; ~62.66% growth)

• Target by 2029-30: 50,000

BrahMos at a Glance

• Developer: BrahMos Aerospace (DRDO–NPOM joint venture)

• Origin agreement: 1998 (India-Russia)

• Ownership: India 50.5% / Russia 49.5%

• Type: Supersonic cruise missile (ramjet, fire-and-forget)

• Speed: ~Mach 2.8–3 (about thrice the speed of sound)

• Range (export variant): ~290 km

• Platforms: Land, Sea, Air, Submarine

• Export customers: Philippines (2022, ~$375 mn); Vietnam (2026, ~$629 mn); Indonesia (in final stages)

India-US Defence Framework Evolution

• 2005: New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship

• 2015: 10-year Defence Framework

• Feb 2025: US-India COMPACT launched

• Oct 2025: Framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership in the 21st Century (2025-2035)

India-US Foundational Agreements GSOMIA – information security LEMOA (2016) – logistics support COMCASA (2018) – secure communications BECA (2020) – geospatial intelligence